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Abstract 
 
Do humans and animals learn exemplars or prototypes when they categorize objects and events 
in the world? How are different degrees of abstraction realized through learning by neurons in 
inferotemporal and prefrontal cortex? How do top-down expectations influence the course of 
learning? Thirty related human cognitive experiments (the 5-4 category structure) have been 
used to test competing views in the prototype-exemplar debate. In these experiments, during the 
test phase, subjects unlearn in a characteristic way items that they had learned to categorize 
perfectly in the training phase. Many cognitive models do not describe how an individual learns 
or forgets such categories through time. Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) neural models 
provide such a description, and also clarify both psychological and neurobiological data. 
Matching of bottom-up signals with learned top-down expectations plays a key role in ART 
model learning. Here, an ART model is used to learn incrementally in response to 5-4 category 
structure stimuli. Simulation results agree with experimental data, achieving perfect 
categorization in training and a good match to the pattern of errors exhibited by human subjects 
in the testing phase. These results show how the model learns both prototypes and certain 
exemplars in the training phase. ART prototypes are, however, unlike the ones posited in the 
traditional prototype-exemplar debate. Rather, they are critical patterns of features to which a 
subject learns to pay attention based on past predictive success and the order in which exemplars 
are experienced. Perturbations of old memories by newly arriving test items generate a 
performance curve that closely matches the performance pattern of human subjects. The model 
also clarifies exemplar-based accounts of data concerning amnesia. 
 
Keywords:  categorization, classification, pattern recognition, exemplar, prototype, supervised 
learning, Adaptive Resonance Theory, ART, expectation, attention 
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1.  Introduction: From Exemplars and Prototypes to Attentionally Modulated Critical 
Feature Patterns 
 
What information is bound together into object or event representations? Some believe that a 
category is represented in memory as a subset of individual experiences or exemplars, like 
familiar faces. Such a memory representation would need to be selective, since storing every 
exemplar that is ever experienced would lead to a combinatorial explosion of storage, as well as 
to unwieldy retrieval. Others consider memory representations to be prototypes that represent 
more general properties of the environment, such as the fact that each person has a face. Such a 
memory representation would still need to address how we learn specific episodic memories.  
In the cognitive science literature on object recognition, the exemplar and prototype 
alternatives have led to prominent models of the human categorization process. In 
prototype-based approaches (Posner & Keele, 1970; Smith & Minda, 1998; Smith, Murray, & 
Minda, 1997; Smith & Minda, 2000), a single center of a category is extracted from many 
exemplars, to-be-categorized items are compared to these prototypes, and these items are 
assigned to the category of the most similar prototype. Exemplar-based approaches (Estes, 1994; 
Medin & Shaffer, 1978; Medin & Smith, 1981; Medin, Dewey, & Murphy, 1984) do not assume 
a single category center. Instead, a more distributed representation of the category domain 
consists of memorized sets of individual exemplars as the core representational units. A new 
item is compared to each stored exemplar, and similarity measures are obtained in terms of these 
comparisons.  
Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages. In the exemplar approach, 
specific events, like a particular face in a particular pose, are directly represented, but this 
approach raises the problem of how to recognize novel variations of familiar events and where to 
draw category boundaries. More generally, the exemplar approach raises questions such as: How 
can one determine the proper level of abstraction when all that is stored are exemplars? In 
addition, how can one search a large exemplar memory in an efficient way? How can one avoid a 
combinatorial explosion as more and more exemplars are learned and searched as life proceeds? 
In particular, why does the reaction time for a recognition event not increase dramatically with 
the total number of stored exemplars?  
In the prototype approach, abstract information, like the fact that each human has a face, 
is directly represented, but this approach raises the problem of how to recognize individual 
events, such as a particular face. Both the prototype and the exemplar approaches raise the 
problem of abstraction, but from opposite ends of the concreteness-abstractness continuum. 
In order to deal with these concerns, a third approach, often called the 
rule-plus-exceptions model (Nosofsky, 1984, 1987; Nosofsky, Kruschke, & McKinley, 1992; 
Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995), attempts to incorporate the strengths of both the exemplar and 
prototype approaches. Rule-plus-exceptions models represent categories mainly by prototypes, 
but also allow the existence of few exemplars that are usually located at points that are distant 
from category centers, or in regions where category boundaries based on distance from 
prototypes would give erroneous results. 
Despite the progress represented by these three modeling approaches, they all experience 
shortcomings. A key difficulty is that all the models take the form of formal equations for 
response probabilities. None of them learns their defining exemplars or prototypes using the type 
2 
of real-time incremental learning process that humans typically experience during a new 
categorization task. Prototype models define prototypes a priori even though these prototypes 
might not be the ones that are actually used by human subjects or by any learning model. None 
of the three types of models explains how exemplar or prototype information may be stored or 
retrieved in real time as part of the brain’s information processing dynamics. In particular, each 
successful exemplar model uses combinations of exemplars, not individual exemplars, to derive 
formal response probabilities, but the real-time process whereby these combinations are derived 
from stored exemplars is not specified. Finally, these models do not shed light upon 
neurophysiological data in areas like inferotemporal (IT) and prefrontal cortex as awake 
behaving monkeys learn and perform categorization tasks (Desimone, 1998; Desimone & 
Ungerleider, 1989; Gochin, Miller, Gross, & Gerstein, 1991; Harries & Perrett, 1991; Mishkin, 
1982; Mishkin & Appenzeller, 1987; Perrett, Mistlin, & Chitty, 1987; Schwartz, Desimone, 
Albright, & Gross, 1983; Spitzer, Desimone, & Moran, 1988). 
When converting formal exemplar models into cognitive learning models, the resulting 
systems implicitly use prototype knowledge that incorporates real-time learning processes. For 
example, in exemplar models such as the context model (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; McKinley & 
Nosofsky, 1995; Medin & Shaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986), the probability of a category A 
response to a test item i may be defined as the sum of the similarities between the test item and 
the stored exemplars j of A, divided by the sum of the similarities between the test item and all 
stored exemplars. In the case where only categories A and B occur, this formula is: 
( )|
ij
j A
ij ij
j A j B
S
P A i
S S
γ
γ γ
∈
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
∑
∑ ∑
, (1) 
where P(A|i) is the probability of a category A response to the test item i, Sij is the similarity 
between test item i and stored exemplar  j, and γ  is a response scaling parameter. How can one 
reconcile the intuition that exemplars are individually activated, indeed winner-take-all, discrete 
points in a multi-dimensional recognition space with probabilistic equations such as (1) that 
involve multiple such representations? An analysis of how to reconcile discrete exemplars with 
distributed probabilities in a system that can self-organize in real time leads naturally to consider 
a modeling framework such as the one that is described in this article. In other words, the model 
that is described in this article may be viewed as a real-time dynamical implementation and 
extension of intuitions and computations that have supported the success of formal exemplar and 
prototype models. 
From the perspective of real-time learning, equation (1) raises the question:  How does an 
exemplar-based recognition system that operates, as the brain does, in real time know which 
exemplars are in category A? It must have this information when computing the numerator in 
order to compare only the exemplars in A with the test item. To think about the problem as the 
outcome of a real-time process, suppose that the exemplars are presented one at a time, and can 
individually activate only their own learned exemplar representations. Suppose, moreover, that 
all interactions with these learned representations are carried out by local operations; that is, by 
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operations that carry information continuously across the space in which the exemplar 
representations live. 
Given that test items are presented one at a time, one needs to explain how presentation 
of a single item i can identify all the stored exemplars j corresponding to Category A, and only to 
Category A, as in the numerator of equation (1), even though the test item i was never presented 
at the same time as any of these stored exemplars j. In order for this to happen, given that the 
individual exemplars are represented by discrete points in space, there needs to be a link from 
every stored exemplar  j to some higher-order representation, which we will also call A. In order 
to compute the category probabilities (1) the system needs to have additional mechanisms such 
as distributed activation of all the stored exemplars j, or a reverse “top-down” link from A to all 
the exemplars j that belong to Category A. For this to happen, when each exemplar is presented 
and learned, learned associations also form between that exemplar and its category 
representation A. When these exemplars are activated, the test item can be compared with them, 
even though none of the exemplars were ever presented simultaneously during the learning 
process.  
When the exemplar representations corresponding to A are simultaneously activated, the 
system needs to compute and sum the similarity of the test item to each of the exemplars in A, as 
described in equation (1). How could this be done?  A clue is derived by noting that humans can 
compare a novel test item with the memory of familiar exemplars. This implies that a novel test 
item must be able to activate Category A before it can be linked with A through associative 
learning. For this to be possible, previous bottom-up learning from familiar exemplars to their 
category must allow a novel test item to activate the category; that is, there needs to exist a 
bottom-up adaptive filtering process that allows the category to be activated by both familiar and 
unfamiliar exemplars. What is the nature of this filtering process? How can it be reconciled with 
the intuition that discrete exemplars are possible? 
The present article proposes how to answer these questions through the use of an 
Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, model that also embodies bottom-up and top-down 
learning processes. This ART model suggests how an adaptive filter within an individual brain 
can incrementally learn critical feature patterns in response to sequences of exemplars that are 
presented one at a time. Such learning can be either unsupervised or supervised. These critical 
feature patterns are associated with recognition categories, such as the category A. When an 
exemplar is presented, it is simultaneously filtered by all the learned critical feature patterns to 
determine which category, or categories, will be activated. Depending on the structure of the 
learning environment, such a critical feature pattern may learn to encode specific information 
that can selectively respond to fine details of an individual exemplar, or general information, that 
can be used to classify multiple similar exemplars with a single category. Typically, 
combinations of specific and general critical feature patterns will be learned to recognize a 
particular object or event, much as in the rule-plus-exceptions model. Intuitively, critical features 
are the ones to which the model learns to pay attention. Critical feature patterns replace both the 
exemplar and the prototype representations of formal models.  
There are several significant differences between the ART model and formal exemplar, 
prototype, and rule-plus-exceptions models. First and foremost, ART discovers its critical feature 
patterns as part of a real-time incremental learning process. Second, an ART critical feature 
pattern defines a new type of “prototype”, but one that differs in crucial ways from the type of 
prototype that is hypothesized in classical prototype models. Rather, ART learns in real time 
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which combinations of critical features are relevant during incremental learning experiences, 
wherein only one exemplar at a time is available to the model. The system never experiences 
batch or global information about all the exemplars in order to specify which combinations of 
features are relevant for recognition. Indeed, the learned critical feature pattern may depend upon 
the order of exemplar presentations, and many different critical feature combinations may lead to 
equally successful performance. Exemplars from multiple objects may also be interleaved 
through time during the learning process. 
As a general, or abstract, category code is learned, ART discovers, in real time, which 
combinations of critical features activate this code. As an exemplar-like code is learned, ART 
learns the critical feature pattern that is specific for the unique features of a small number of 
similar exemplars. For both prototype and exemplar learning, top-down expectations focus 
attention on those input features that are part of the critical feature pattern that is specific to the 
current recognition event. These top-down expectations help to stabilize the learning process, 
and thereby to avoid catastrophic forgetting of previously learned memories. These ART 
dynamics are consistent with many facts about how inferotemporal cortex learns, notably the 
competitive and top-down priming properties that have been identified in neurophysiological 
experiments; e.g., Desimone (1998). 
 
 
2.  Thirty Cognitive Experiments Using the 5-4 Category Structure 
 
A substantial body of the debate over which model best describes human cognitive data has been 
based on the 5-4 category structure. Starting in the early 1980s, exemplar-based models gave 
consistently better fits than prototype-based models to experimental data within this paradigm. 
However, Smith and Minda (2000) have shown, by reviewing thirty experimental studies with 
this category structure, that when allowed greater flexibility, newer prototype models produce 
better results than earlier versions. Before showing how an ART model quantitatively simulates 
the targeted data (Section 5) for experimental categories that are learned in real time (Section 4), 
exemplar and prototype models are here reviewed (Section 3). 
Table 1 
Experiments with the 5-4 category structure have used geometric shapes, Brunswick 
faces, yearbook photos, verbal descriptions, and rocket ship drawings. In each experiment, five 
exemplars are labeled as Category A (A1-A5) and four as Category B (B6-B9). The other 
exemplars are unlabeled (T10-T16) (Table 1).  During a testing, or transfer, phase, subjects are 
asked to identify each of the 16 exemplars as belonging to Category A or Category B. 
During training on a 5-4 category structure task, an ART system learns using a set of 
category coding nodes which, like the hidden units of a multilayer perceptron, lie between the 
network’s input and output layers. Each coding node is connected to either Category A or 
Category B. During training, active coding nodes learn a critical feature pattern. Some critical 
feature patterns incorporate a variety of exemplars and play the role of prototypes, or “rules”. 
Other learned patterns resemble specific exemplars, or “exceptions”. The network produces a 
minimal number of exemplar and prototype coding nodes to learn the categorization task for a 
given set of input exemplars, presented one at a time. 
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Many studies that use the 5-4 category structure (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Medin & 
Smith, 1981; Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984; Nosofsky et al., 1992; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & 
McKinley, 1994; Lamberts, 1995) define category prototypes as the two extreme points of the 
sample space; namely, A = T12 = [ ]1,1,1,1  for Category A, and B = B9 = [ ]0,0,0,0  for 
Category B. With the exception of exemplar A2, items in Category A share three features with 
prototype A = [ ]1,1,1,1  and only one feature with prototype B = [ ]0,0,0,0 . Exemplar B8 shares 
three features with prototype B = [ ]0,0,0,0 . The remaining labeled exemplars A2, B6, and B7 
share two features with each prototype. No single feature is perfectly diagnostic, since it is not 
possible to separate items correctly into the two categories based on knowledge of only one 
component. 
The structural ratio is an index of within-category coherence and between-category 
differentiation used by Smith and Minda (2000). This measure is defined as the ratio of 
within-category similarity to between-category similarity. For the 5-4 category structure, the 
within-category similarity is 2.4 and the between-category similarity is 1.6. The structural ratio is 
thus 2.4 1.6 1.5= , which is quite low:  a structural ratio of 1 indicates no differentiation, and a 
structural ratio greater than 3 indicates easy differentiation.  
Figure 1 
Silhouette plots (Figure 1a) also reflect the poor between-category differentiation of the 
low structural ratio of the 5-4 category structure. The Silhouette index ( )S i  is a measure of the 
extent to which an item i belongs to the cluster to which it has been assigned (Kaufman & 
Rousseeuw, 1990; Rousseeuw, 1987). This index is defined as: 
{ }
( ) ( )( )   for 1,...,9
max ( ), ( )
i iS i i
i i
β α
α β
−= =  (2) 
where ( )iα  is the average distance from item i to all other items in its own category and ( )iβ  is 
the average distance from item i to all items in the other category. Values of the Silhouette index 
( )S i  lie between –1 and +1. ( )S i  is close to +1 when ( ) 0iα ≅ , indicating that item i strongly 
belongs to the category to which it is assigned, and that all items in this category are similar to 
one another. ( )S i  is negative when ( ) ( )i iβ α< , suggesting that item i is assigned to the wrong 
category. A small ( )S i  value indicates ambiguous category membership. The degree of 
belonging to its own category is weak for at least four items (A4, A5, B6, and B7). In fact, 
( ) 0.405S i =  for the prototype B = B9 = [ ]0,0,0,0 , and other Silhouette indices are below 0.37.  
 In order to clarify category membership in for the 5-4 paradigm, consider a distance 
measure ( oldd ) that is scaled by an exponential factor: 
( )exp 10new oldd d= . (3) 
After exponential scaling of the city-block distance (Figure 1a), only items B6 and B7 have 
ambiguous category membership, item A2 is clearly in the wrong category, and the Silhouette 
values for all other items are much larger than for the unscaled distances (Figure 1b). 
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3. Categorization Models 
 
3.1. The Multiplicative Prototype Model 
In the Multiplicative Prototype Model (Nosofsky, 1987, 1991), the distance iAd  or iBd  from the 
ith exemplar Xi to the prototype A = [ ]1,1,1,1  or to the prototype B = [ ]0,0,0,0  is defined as the 
weighted sum of the city-block distance, scaled by a sensitivity parameter c: 
 
4 4
1 1
| Xi A | | Xi 1 |iA j j j j j
j j
d c w c w
= =
= − = −∑ ∑  
and  (4) 
4 4
1 1
| Xi B | | Xi 0 |iB j j j j j
j j
d c w c w
= =
= − = −∑ ∑  
for i = 1,…,16. In equation (4), Xij is the value of the jth component of exemplar i; Aj and Bj are 
the jth components of prototypes A and B; and wj is the weight assigned to component j, with 
4
1
1j
j
w
=
=∑ . (5)  
Note that, since each exemplar component Xi j  equals 0 or 1, 
( )4 4 4 4
1 1 1 1
1 Xi Xi 1 XiiA j j j j j j j
j j j j
d c w c w w c w
= = = =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − = − = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
and (6) 
4
1
XiiB j j
j
d c w
=
= ∑ . 
Thus the sum iA iBd d c+ = , and the difference between the distances from exemplar Xi to the two 
categories is: 
[ ]4
1
1 2 Xi ,iA iB j j i
j
d d c w z c c
=
⎛ ⎞− = − ≡ ∈ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . (7) 
Note that, for the prototypes, 0iAd =  when Xi = A and 0iBd =  when Xi = B. Since all 
components are binary, the city-block distance is equivalent to the Hamming distance. 
 In the Multiplicative Prototype Model, the measures of similarity iAS  and iBS  between 
the exemplar Xi and the prototypes A and B are defined by a decreasing function of the distances 
iAd  and iBd : 
( )
( )
exp
exp
iA iA
iB iB
S d
S d
= −
= −  (8) 
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for i = 1,…,16. The rationale for taking the exponential of the distance is often given as the fact 
that the human perceptual system works in a logarithmic scale. In addition, analysis of the 
Silhouette index data (Section 2) shows that the binary exemplars themselves benefit from 
exponential rescaling in order to achieve good within-category coherence and between-category 
separation.  
 The probability P(A|i) of a Category A response to item i is assumed to be proportional to 
the similarity iAS  between exemplar Xi and prototype A: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 1 exp 1 expiA iB iA iB i
iA iB iA
S S
P A i d d z
S S S
−
− −⎡ ⎤= = + = + − = +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦+ ⎣ ⎦
 (9) 
The last expression in equation (9) suggests that the probability density function P(A|i) can be 
obtained by first projecting the four-dimensional exemplar space onto a line parameterized by 
iz , and then applying a sigmoid transformation to the projected value iz . Estimation of 
probability density functions of multi-dimensional data by means of projections to lower 
dimensions is a widely used technique that lies at the heart of many nonlinear methods, including 
projection pursuit regression and multilayer perceptrons (Bishop, 1995; Duda, Hart, & Stork, 
2001; Friedman & Stuetzle, 1981; Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2001; Ripley, 1996). 
A similar model may be derived starting from a purely statistical perspective. As above, 
the goal is to find the probability of assigning item i to Category A; i.e., 
( | ) (  |  )P A i Probability Category is A item is i= . With the assumption of only two categories, the 
Bayes formula implies: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
P i A P A P i A P A P B P i B
P A i
P i P i A P A P i B P B P A P i A
−⎡ ⎤= = = +⎢ ⎥+ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, (10) 
where P(A) and P(B) are prior probabilities of the two categories and P(i|A) is the probability of 
observing item i given that it is in Category A. For the 5-4 category structure, the two priors P(A) 
and P(B) are constant and so is their ratio, ( ) ( )P B P A γ≡ . By equation (10), 
( ) ( )( )
1
1
P i B
P A i
P i A
γ
−⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. (11) 
This is the Bayes formula which relates the priors P(i|A) and P(i|B) to the posterior P(A|i). Up to 
the constant γ , equation (11) has the same form as the second expression in equation (9). The 
similarity measure iAS  is analogous to the conditional probability P(i|A) of observing item i 
given that the sample comes from the group labeled Category A. Thus, the Multiplicative 
Prototype Model can be interpreted as a Bayesian model with a specific assumption about the 
form of the priors P(i|A) and P(i|B). 
 
3.2.  The Context Model 
The Context Model is an exemplar model introduced by Medin and colleagues (Medin & 
Shaffer, 1978; Medin & Smith, 1981; Medin, Dewey, et al., 1984). This model considers 
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distances and similarity measures for each pair of exemplars Xi and Xj, and the model has no 
explicit prototypes. Distances and similarity measures are defined as in equations (4) and (8) for 
the Multiplicative Prototype Model. As in equation (1), the probability P(A|i) of a Category A 
response is proportional to the sum of similarities Sij between the test item Xi and all stored 
exemplars Xj of Category A: 
( )
1
| 1
ij ij
j A j B
ij ij ij
j A j B j A
S S
P A i
S S S
−
∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= = +⎢ ⎥+ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ .  (12) 
To understand how the Context Model works, consider how the two sums in equation (12) 
change for different types of test exemplars. First, if the test exemplar Xi is an old item of 
Category A { }( )1,2,3,4,5i ∈ , then: 
4
1
1
0 1
k ik jk
ij k
ij
j A j ij A
j A
c w X Xd
S e e e ε=
∈ ≠∈
∈
− −−= = + ≡ +∑
∑∑ ∑  (13) 
and 
1
2
4
| |k ik jkij k
ij
j B j B j B
c w X Xd
S e e ε=
∈ ∈ ∈
− −∑−= = ≡∑ ∑ ∑ . (14) 
Then, equation (12) becomes: 
( )
1
2
1
| 1
1
P A i ε ε
−⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
. (15) 
Similarly, if the test exemplar Xi is an old item of Category B { }( )6,7,8,9i ∈ , then: 
( )
1
4
3
1
| 1P A i εε
−⎡ ⎤+= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. (16) 
If the test exemplar Xi is a new transfer item { }( )10,11,12,13,14,15,16i ∈ , then: 
( )
1
6
5
| 1P A i
ε
ε
−⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. (17) 
For sufficiently large values of the sensitivity parameter c, all 1kε << . In this case, for a test item 
Xi in Category A, ( )| 1P A i ≅  in equation (15); and for a test item Xi in Category B, 
( )| 0P A i ≅  in equation (16). For new test items Xi, the ratio 6 5ε ε  may assume any positive 
value, so ( )|P A i  in equation (17) may assume any value between 0 and 1, even as c → ∞ . 
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When Xi is close to the exemplars of Category A, then 6 5ε ε<<  and ( )| 1P A i ≅ ; when Xi is 
close to the exemplars of Category B, then 6 5ε ε>>  and ( )| 0P A i ≅ . 
Equation (12) of the Context Model has the same form as the Bayesian model in 
equation (11). However, where the Prototype Model assumes that the distribution P(i|A) is 
unimodal (Gaussian centered at the prototype A), the Context Model assumes a multimodal form 
for this distribution and approximates it with a sum of Gaussians centered at all the exemplars of 
Category A. 
Both the Prototype Model and the Context Model provide a probabilistic framework to fit 
the sixteen four-dimensional items to the empirical P(A|i) curve. Neither model includes 
incremental learning of exemplar and prototype representations, or a real-time cognitive 
information processing description of how items are stored and retrieved. An ART model that 
does have these properties will now be introduced. 
 
 
4. Adaptive Resonance Theory 
 
Adaptive resonance theory, or ART, was introduced as a neural theory of sensory and cognitive 
development, learning, and information processing (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987, 1991; 
Grossberg, 1976, 1978, 1980). ART predicts that the processes whereby our brains continue to 
learn about a changing world in a stable fashion throughout life lead to conscious experiences. 
These processes include the learning of top-down expectations, the matching of these 
expectations against bottom-up information, the focusing of attention upon expected clusters of 
information, and the development of resonant states between these bottom-up and top-down 
processes as they reach a predictive and attentive consensus between what is expected and what 
is present in the outside world. The name Adaptive Resonance Theory summarizes the predicted 
link between resonance and learning. ART concepts and mechanisms provide natural 
explanations for a wide array of psychophysical and neurobiological data. Indeed, all of the 
major ART predictions about mechanisms of, and links among, Consciousness, Learning, 
Expectation, Attention, Resonance, and Synchrony (CLEARS) have received support from 
subsequent psychological and neurobiological experiments:  see reviews in Grossberg (1999, 
2003a, 2003b, 2007), Grossberg and Versace (2008), and Raizada and Grossberg (2003).  
In particular, an early ART prediction is that attention is expressed through a top-down 
modulatory on-center, off-surround network that realizes the ART Matching Rule (Carpenter & 
Grossberg, 1987). This process predicted specific links among top-down expectations, 
cooperative-competitive matching, and attention. The substantial data that have supported this 
prediction have led various authors to use the phrase “biased competition” to describe attentional 
processing; e.g., Desimone (1998) and Kastner and Ungerleider (2001). This particular type of 
top-down attention has been mathematically proved to be necessary to achieve a solution of the 
so-called stability-plasticity dilemma (Grossberg, 1980), or how fast, even one-trial, learning of 
new knowledge can occur without causing catastrophic forgetting of already learned memories 
within complex and changing stimulus environments (e.g., Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987, 1991). 
This property supports another major ART prediction, namely that “all conscious states in the 
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brain are resonant states,” and that these attentive resonant states trigger fast learning of sensory 
and cognitive representations when they amplify and synchronize distributed neural signals that 
are bound together by resonance. The brain takes a risk whenever it changes its previously 
learned memory traces. ART shows how context-sensitive resonant states can lead to the 
learning of effective new knowledge without undermining previously learned knowledge. 
As ART has developed as a cognitive and neural theory that is aimed at explaining and 
predicting ever larger psychological and neurobiological databases, it has been developed in 
parallel as a series of ever more powerful computational algorithms that learn to carry out 
large-scale intelligent categorization and prediction tasks. The algorithmic developments have, in 
turn, led to new design principles concerning how the corresponding brain processes work. Two 
fundamental design goals in ART models are memory stability with fast (one-trial) or slow 
learning in an evolving input environment, and memory compression when inputs are noisy and 
unconstrained. 
As a real-time model of dynamic processes, an ART network is characterized by a system 
of ordinary differential equations, which are approximated by computational algorithms for 
efficient implementation. Structurally, a general ART model can be described as consisting of a 
number of functionally different fields with numerous nodes within each field. ART fields 
represent either different brain regions or different cortical layers within a region. Nodes 
represent individual neurons or neuronal populations. Nodes in different fields communicate 
with each other via signals that are gated by long-term memory (LTM) traces. LTM traces are 
typically associated with synaptic processes at the interface between transmitting and receiving 
neurons. 
 
4.1. Learning features that are absent and features that are present 
Since its introduction as part of the fuzzy ART model (Carpenter, Grossberg, & Rosen, 1991), a 
preprocessing step called complement coding has become a standard element of ART 
implementations. Component activities ai of each exemplar vector a are first scaled so that 
0 1ia≤ ≤ , where 1,...,i M=  and M is the number of input dimensions. Then, for each feature i, 
both the ON cell activity, ia , and its complementary OFF cell activity, ( )1ci ia a= − , are 
represented at an input field F0 as the 2M-dimensional input vector ( ), c=A a a . Complement 
coding allows a model to encode features that are consistently absent, as well those that are 
consistently present, within each critical feature pattern. In a 5-4 category structure, 4M = , and 
a typical exemplar is [ ]A4 1,1,0,1= =a . The complement of A4 is [ ]0,0,1,0c =a , and the 
complement coded ART input for this exemplar is [ ]1,1,0,1, 0,0,1,0=A . Correspondingly, the 
stored LTM traces of a category coding node J comprise a 2M-dimensional vector whose 
components 1,...,i M=  code features that are consistently present when J is active, and whose 
components 1,..., 2i M M= +  code features that are consistently absent when J is active. For 
example, a typical category coding node J that A4 might activate stores the memory 
[ ]1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,1, 0 . The critical feature pattern [ ]1,*,0,*  of this node favors exemplars in which 
feature 1 is present ( 1 1a = ) and feature 3 is absent ( 3 0a = ). Values of the remaining features 2 
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and 4 may be either 0 or 1. In addition to A4, node J would favor exemplars B6 = [ ]1,1,0,0 , 
T10 = [ ]1,0,0,1 , and T11 = [ ]1,0,0,0 . 
 
4.2. Distributed ARTMAP 
The number of fields, the rules by which their nodes are activated, and the way various fields 
interact vary across ART models. Early ART systems, including the unsupervised ART1 
(Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987) and fuzzy ART (Carpenter, Grossberg, & Rosen, 1991), and the 
supervised ARTMAP (Carpenter, Grossberg, & Reynolds, 1991) and fuzzy ARTMAP 
(Carpenter, Grossberg, Markuzon, Reynolds, & Rosen, 1992) networks, used winner-take-all 
dynamics, in which an input activates a single category coding node, according to its learned 
critical feature pattern. Starting with ART-EMAP (Carpenter & Ross, 1993, 1995), ART 
networks have employed distributed codes during testing while learning with winner-take-all 
codes, a general-purpose standard that has become the default ARTMAP design (Carpenter, 
2003). 
Most applications of ART and ARTMAP to technology employ winner-take-all coding 
during network learning. Experimental data on human performance of 5-4 category structure 
tasks was best modeled by the distributed ARTMAP (dARTMAP) system, which employs 
distributed coding during both the training and the testing phases of simulation experiments 
(Carpenter, 1997; Carpenter, Milenova, & Noeske, 1998) (Figure 2). Open-source code for 
winner-take-all and distributed ARTMAP systems may be downloaded from 
http://cns.bu.edu/techlab/CLASSER/ . 
Figure 2 
The distributed ARTMAP signal from the input field F0 that activates a distributed set of 
category coding nodes at the field F2 is gated by LTM traces that compute adaptive thresholds. 
In contrast, LTM traces in many learning models, including early ART networks, are 
multiplicative weights. In biological terms, multiplicative weights function as adaptive gains. In 
a distributed representation, such weights may cause catastrophic forgetting (Carpenter, 1994).  
Before dARTMAP makes a category prediction, the bottom-up input A is matched 
against the top-down learned expectation, or critical feature pattern, σ  that is read out by the 
active distributed code. (See Figure 2 and Appendix equations A14 and A15.) The matching 
criterion is set by a parameter ρ , called vigilance. (See Appendix equations A16 and A17.) Low 
vigilance permits the learning of general category codes with abstract prototypes, while high 
vigilance requires the learning of specific category codes with exemplar-like prototypes. 
Vigilance is initially set at a baseline level ρ , typically set to zero to maximize generalization. 
Vigilance rises in response to predictive error via an internally controlled process called match 
tracking (Carpenter, Grossberg, & Reynolds, 1991). Match tracking realizes minimax learning, 
which balances the goal of creating prototypes that are as specific as needed to correct errors, but 
that are still as general as possible to conserve memory resources. (See Appendix equation A23.) 
A typical mix of learned general and specific memories is like a self-organizing rules-plus-
exceptions system. ART learning may produce a wide variety of such mixtures, which depend 
upon the order of presentation of the training exemplars, and which all correctly encode a given 
input set. 
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The match field F1 represents the matched activation pattern σ= ∧x A , where ∧  
denotes the component-wise minimum, or fuzzy intersection, between the bottom-up input A and 
the top-down expectation σ . If the matched pattern fails to meet the matching criterion, then the 
active category code is reset at F2, and the system searches for another category code y that 
better represents the input. The match criterion is evaluated in the ART orienting system. Each 
active feature in the input pattern A excites the orienting system with gain equal to the vigilance 
parameter ρ . Hence, with complement coding, the total excitatory input is 2
1
M
i
i
A Mρ ρ ρ
=
= =∑A . 
Active cells in the matched pattern x inhibit the orienting system, leading to a total inhibitory 
input equal to 
2
1
M
i
i
x
=
− = −∑x . If 0ρ − ≤A x , then the orienting system remains quiet, allowing 
resonance and learning to occur. If 0ρ − >A x , then the orienting system is activated, resets 
the category code y currently active at F2, and initiates search for a better matching category 
code. Whenever an F2 category code y is found such that the resulting F1 feature pattern x 
satisfies the inequality 0ρ − ≤A x , y is said to meet the matching criterion. The code y can 
then predict an output category K' at the field 0
abF  (Figure 2). During training, the match field 
1
abF  determines whether the predicted output category K ′  matches the actual output category K. 
If it does not, then a reset causes vigilance to rise until search for a category code with a better 
match is initiated. 
 
4.3. Continuing to learn during testing 
In most supervised learning applications, a model’s LTM traces do not change once training is 
complete. For such applications, ARTMAP systems are designed to make accurate predictions 
on training exemplars, should they appear during testing. Experiments on learning 5-4 category 
structures reveal, however, that human subjects miscategorize examples in the testing phase, 
even for items that they had learned to label perfectly in the training phase. Human performance 
thus suggests ongoing adaptation as subjects provide their own exemplar labels. 
Four dARTMAP post-training LTM update methods were considered. In each, the 
adaptive thresholds that gate bottom-up signals to F2 and top-down signals to F1 (Figure 2) 
continued to be modified during the testing phase. Learned dARTMAP LTM thresholds were 
perturbed either randomly or according to the learning laws that had been used in the training 
phase. The success of these various combinations in simulating the data supports the hypothesis 
that ART dynamics can robustly model human performance on 5-4 category structure tasks.  
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dARTMAP post-training LTM adaptation 
Model 0. LTM does not change in the post-training interval. 
Model 1. dARTMAP learning law without credit assignment:  LTM threshold update rules 
are applied across all active F2 nodes. 
Model 2. dARTMAP learning law with credit assignment:  The predicted category K' is 
treated as a teaching signal. Prior to LTM threshold updates, all F2 category 
coding nodes not mapped to K' are reset, and the F2 category code y is 
renormalized, as in supervised training.  
Model 3. Random, Active:  Normally distributed random noise ( )20,Nξ ν∼  is added to 
LTM thresholds of all active nodes.  
Model 4. Random, Winning:  Normally distributed random noise is added to LTM 
thresholds of all nodes mapped to the winning category K'.  
 
 
5.  dARTMAP Learning of the 5-4 Category Structure 
 
Each dARTMAP simulation trial uses the set of input-output pairs defined by the 5-4 category 
paradigm. A given simulation trial trains on inputs A1,…,A5 and B6,…,B9, two copies each. 
The 18 labeled inputs are presented once, in a random order. During training, an exemplar is 
presented to dARTMAP as an input a, and its category label (A or B) is presented as a binary 
target output b. In the testing phase, two copies of each of the 16 input exemplars are presented, 
again in a random order. The fraction of models predicting Category A is recorded for each item. 
In all, dARTMAP networks were trained and tested on 5,000 simulation trials, each defined by 
the random ordering of its input exemplars. 
 Only the approximately 1,500 trials in which 100% correct categorization was achieved 
after training were recorded. Because the simulation trials are the result of a random ordering of 
training exemplars, the precise number of trials with perfect categorization accuracy varies with 
the randomization seed. Typically, between 1,491 and 1,494 out of 5,000 simulation trials have 
100% correct categorization. This simulation protocol corresponds to the experimental selection 
of subjects who met the performance criterion of correctly learning the task during training. The 
fraction of models predicting Category A for each item, P(A|i), was then compared to the 
Category A response probabilities from the experiments listed in Appendix B of Smith & Minda 
(2000). The goodness of fit to the experiments was measured in terms of the sum of the squared 
deviations (SSD) from the experimental mean.  
 All distributed ARTMAP parameters were held at their default values (Carpenter et al., 
1998), including the baseline vigilance parameter ( 0ρ = ; see Appendix equations A16, A17, 
and A23) and the learning rate (β = 1; see Appendix equations A25 and A26). For the noise-
based LTM update Models 3 and 4, grid search was used to find the standard deviation (ν; see 
Appendix equations A28-A30) of post-training noise that produced the best fits to the 
experimental data. 
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6.  dARTMAP Simulation of 5-4 Category Structure Experiments 
 
6.1.  Fits to experimental data by dARTMAP post-training LTM adaptation models 
Figure 3 summarizes fits to 5-4 category experiments by the four dARTMAP post-training LTM 
adaptation models, as compared to models described by Smith and Minda (2000). Simulations of 
all four post-training LTM update methods fit the data reasonably well, producing error values in 
the same range as those from the Smith and Minda models. Update methods 3 and 4, wherein 
dARTMAP LTM is perturbed by random noise after training, fit the experimental data best, 
outperforming the additive exemplar and fixed low sensitivity models from the Smith and Minda 
review.  
Figure 3 
Figure 4 illustrates dARTMAP model fits to experimental data across the 16 test 
exemplars of the 5-4 category paradigm. Even without any post-training LTM updates 
(Model 0), the model fits the transfer items T10,…,T16 well. Perturbing LTM thresholds with 
random noise (Models 3 and 4) provides a better fit to observed post-training performance on 
items A1,…,A5 and B6,…,B9 than methods that apply self-supervised learning laws during the 
post-training interval (Models 1 and 2). This is true because training points are almost always 
already inside the winning category coding box, so no learning occurs. Even with fast learning 
(β = 1 in Appendix equations A25 and A26), self-supervised learning models 1 and 2 change 
very few predictions. Using model 1, 75% of trials do not produce any post-training changes in 
predictions. On 25% of trials, self-supervised learning does result in one or more prediction 
changes. Most often, predictions changed as a result of learning on transfer items that were 
outside category boxes, but on a few trials, distributed supervised learning left training items 
outside category boxes as well.  
Figure 4 
Note that these fits are the result of a neural model that incrementally learns on the 
training data presented in Table 1, tuning only a single parameter (noise amplitude ν) to fit the 
mean P(A|i) over the thirty experiments. In contrast, the formal models presented in Smith and 
Minda (2000) do not learn. Instead, they all tune multiple parameters to fit each individual 
experiment. They include a “guessing parameter,” which determines the proportion of 
predictions under which the model randomly guesses a category. This parameter is the only 
means by which the models can fit results for training exemplars A1-A5 and B6-B9. Each model 
tunes four weights (one per input dimension), the guessing parameter, and in some cases, a 
kernel width parameter, one or more sensitivity parameters, and other free parameters. The 
“mixture” model, which best fits the experimental data, has 7 parameters (4 weights, 3 free 
parameters), 9 stored exemplars, and 2 stored prototypes, and all the parameters are tuned via 
gradient descent to fit each experiment individually.  
Results of dARTMAP model simulations are robust across a wide range of parameter 
values. For post-training adaptation methods 1 and 2, the error remains below 0.62 for all 
learning rates ( ]0,1β ∈  and all baseline vigilance values [ )0,0.24ρ ∈ . For methods 3 and 4, 
which perturb with noise, the error remains consistently below 0.40 for all noise standard 
deviations ( ]0,0.04ν ∈  and all baseline vigilance values [ )0,0.24ρ ∈ . 
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Figure 3 also shows that, when 4 of the model parameters are tuned rather than just 1, 
namely the signal rule parameter α  in Appendix equation A8, the match tracking parameter ε 
(A23), noise amplitude ν (A28, A29), and CAM rule power p (A10), then the model fit 
significantly improves (see Figure 3, rightmost bar). 
 
6.2.  Prototypes and exemplars learned by dARTMAP 
On a given simulation trial, the number of category coding nodes that are committed for each 
category in the training phase, and the size of the feature space that their LTM units span, 
provide insight into the nature of the internal coding for that trial. Since ARTMAP uses the 
city-block distance measure (L1 norm), the feature space region representing the LTM of each 
node forms a hyperbox in the four-dimensional input space. The length of each side of the 
category coding box RJ represents the range of values of the corresponding features that belong 
to category coding node J. The size and shape of RJ as a whole measures the generality of the 
category coding node J. The number of F2 nodes that map to a given output category is a 
measure of the distribution of the category representation. When a category coding node J is first 
activated by an input vector a, JR  begins as a point box of size 0. That is, the ends of the i
th box 
edge equal ai. ARTMAP design ensures that each hyperbox can only increase during learning, 
moving from exemplar-like point boxes toward prototype-like representations with larger 
category coding boxes. The size of a category coding box is a measure of the degree of 
generalization embodied in the LTM traces that the category coding box represents. 
Figure 5 
Figure 6 
Figure 5 illustrates that, for 86% of the simulation trials, distributed ARTMAP typically creates 
two category coding nodes per category. On 13% of trials, dARTMAP creates three category 
coding nodes for one or the other category, and rarely creates one or four nodes per category. 
Since nearly all simulations produced more than one category coding node for each category, 
there is no single learned center or prototype-based representation. Since the number of coding 
nodes is always less than the number of training exemplars, the memory representation is not 
purely exemplar-based. Instead, for each category, the network typically creates a general 
category coding box that spans a large region of the feature space, plus one or two smaller boxes 
for items that cannot be adequately represented by the general coding box. Indeed, the histogram 
of box sizes (Figure 6) indicates a bimodal distribution for both Category A and Category B. 
Histogram peaks show large “prototype” boxes of size 3 and “exemplar” point boxes of size 0. 
This distribution illustrates how dARTMAP often self-organizes a rule-plus-exceptions memory. 
Figure 7 
To visualize the rule-plus-exceptions nature of the dARTMAP learned representations, the 16 
four-dimensional inputs and the category coding boxes created by dARTMAP were linearly 
projected onto a two-dimensional plane spanned by the vectors [ ]2/3, 1/3, 0, 0  (horizontal axis) 
and [ ]0, 0, 2/3, 1/3  (vertical axis). In other words, a 4D point [ ]1 2 3 4, , ,a a a a=a  is projected to 
the 2D point 2 1 2 11 2 3 43 3 3 3,a a a a+ +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . This projection maps the prototypes [ ]B9 0,0,0,0=  and 
[ ]T12 1,1,1,1=  to [ ]0,0  and [ ]1,1 . On this projection plane, the training items labeled 
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Category A and Category B are well separated, as are the transfer items that subjects typically 
assign to either of these categories. Figure 7 illustrates three sample dARTMAP trials that are 
like rule-plus-exceptions encoding. For each category, the examples in Figure 7 show one large 
prototype coding box, along with one small exemplar box. 
Figure 8 
Over 65% of the dARTMAP simulations produced ideal rule-plus-exceptions encodings for both 
Category A and Category B (Figure 7), and 91% of the simulations had such an encoding for at 
least one category. Figure 8 shows some of the less commonly learned coding schemes, 
produced by particular input orderings. Both the typical and the atypical systems in Figures 7 and 
8 learned to categorize all training exemplars perfectly. 
The two-dimensional projections of dARTMAP category coding boxes illustrate why 
adding noise to the adaptive thresholds of LTM traces (see Section 4.2 and the Appendix) leads 
to a pattern of errors on training exemplars that is similar to the errors observed in the thirty 
human experiments. A small amount of noise added to a large “rule” coding box will not move 
enclosed exemplars outside of the box, and therefore, the category prediction for those exemplars 
will remain unchanged. For example, the system shown in the first plot of Figure 7 will not 
change its prediction for A5 if a small amount of noise is added to the Category A “rule” coding 
box. Even if noise shifts the box such that A5 is no longer enclosed, this Category A box is still 
the closest to A5, and the category prediction will remain A. However, when an exemplar is 
represented by an “exception” point box, a small amount of noise can shift the point box away 
from the exemplar, thereby changing the model’s prediction. For example, in the first plot of 
Figure 7, a small amount of noise applied to the point box at B7 might shift the box away from 
the exemplar B7, changing the prediction for B7 from Category B to Category A, which is the 
category of the enclosing “rule” box. 
Figure 9 
This discussion suggests that the following probabilities may be correlated: the probability that a 
training exemplar is represented by “exception” point boxes, the probability that the model 
changes its category prediction for this exemplar, and the probability that experimental subjects 
change the corresponding prediction. Figure 9 illustrates that these correlations exist. The 
correlation coefficient between the probability that a training exemplar is represented by a point 
box and the probability that experimental subjects erroneously categorize this exemplar during 
testing is 0.90 (p < 0.001). 
 
6.3.  Predictive power of each feature 
One theoretical measure of the predictive power of each feature, represented as an exemplar 
component ia , is the ratio of correct category values along dimension i for all training items to 
the number of training items (Table 1). For example, the first component equals 1 for four of the 
Category A training items and equals 0 for three of the Category B items. Thus, the predictive 
power of component 1a  equals ( )4 3 9 7 9 0.78+ = ≅ . The farther from 0.5 this value is, the 
more predictive power it has. The values of this measure of predictive power for components 2a , 
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3a , and 4a  are 0.56, 0.78, and 0.67. These values suggest that subjects should primarily use 
exemplar components 1a  and 3a  in their categorization decisions, and ignore 2a . 
If dARTMAP captures the dynamics of the decision process, its LTM traces should 
reflect the predictive power of each feature. One way to measure this is to count the number of 
ARTMAP category coding nodes that match a specific value for a feature dimension, rather than 
matching any value, as described in Section 4.1. For example, consider the large Category A box 
at the top half of the first plot in Figure 7. It will best match exemplars with a3 = 1 and a4 = 1, 
regardless of their values for a1 and a2. We would then say that the node for this category coding 
box counts toward the predictive power of a3 and a4. Across all 1,493 simulations trials, 65% of 
coding nodes are specific to a particular value of a1, 43% for a2, 66% for a3 and 50% to a4. To 
better compare these values to the predictive power indices, we can normalize the vector 
[ 0.65, 0.43, 0.66, 0.50 ] so that their elements sum to one, and then do the same to the predictive 
power indices [ 0.78, 0.56, 0.78 0.67 ]. This scaling removes the absolute differences between 
the two vectors but preserves the relative differences between the vector elements. The 
normalized vector from the dARTMAP simulations, [ 0.29, 0.19, 0.29, 0.22 ], is very similar to 
the normalized predictive power indices, [ 0.28, 0.20, 0.28, 0.24 ]. Therefore, the incrementally 
learned categories are sensitive to the relative predictive power of the input features. 
 
 
7.  Discussion  
 
The classical prototype and exemplar models are based on conflicting assumptions about the 
nature of category representation in humans, even though the models produce similar statistical 
fits to experimental data. In order to differentiate these models, we suggest that, instead of 
looking at how well a given model fits the probability P(A|i) that exemplar i is placed by a 
subject in Category A, one should look at the shape of the probability distribution P(i|A) of 
exemplar i given the fact that the item belongs to Category A. The multiplicative prototype 
model assumes a unimodal distribution that could be approximated by a Gaussian centered at the 
prototype, while the exemplar model assumes multimodal distributions that could be 
approximated by a sum of Gaussians each centered at exemplars.  
In order to better characterize the dynamics of category learning and information 
processing, this article adopted a substantially different approach. Rather than defining an 
analytical expression that maps the sixteen four-dimensional input exemplars to observations 
obtained from human categorization experiments using the 5-4 category structure, each 
dARTMAP trial simulates the incremental learning and decision making process of an individual 
experimental subject, with aggregate model results compared to the results from the thirty Smith 
and Minda experiments.  
Previous studies have shown that ART-based models fit data about learning, in particular 
categorization data (Bhatt, Carpenter, & Grossberg, 2007; Boardman, Grossberg, & Cohen, 
1997; Carpenter & Grossberg, 1991, 1993; Fazl, Grossberg, & Mingolla, 2008; Grossberg, 1999, 
2003a; Grossberg, Govindarajan, Wyse, & Cohen, 2003; Grossberg & Merrill, 1996; Grossberg 
& Myers, 2000; Grossberg & Stone, 1986; Grossberg & Versace, 2008; Raizada & Grossberg, 
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2003). In particular, ART posits that both bottom-up and top-down processes contribute to 
category learning, and that sufficiently large mismatches between bottom-up data and learned 
top-down expectations can drive a memory search for a new or better-fitting category coding 
node. ART learning enables the autonomous recruitment of new category coding nodes and the 
refinement of previously learned critical feature patterns in response to new training exemplars. 
A dynamically controlled vigilance process helps to determine how general a category will 
become based on its ability to predict the correct categorization. Psychophysical and 
neurobiological data that support these ART predictions have been reviewed elsewhere; e.g., 
Grossberg (2003a, 2003b) and Grossberg and Versace (2008). 
Results in the present article show that good fits to data with the 5-4 category structure 
are achieved by a dARTMAP model augmented by post-training LTM adaptation, realized as 
Models 1-4. Models 3 and 4 simply perturb memories with low-amplitude noise during recall. 
This addition causes categorization errors that model how human subjects miscategorize 
exemplars that they had previously learned perfectly. This learning scheme fits the data and 
provides additional support for ART as a possible explanation of brain categorization.  
A self-supervised learning rule applied at the post-training stage can also explain the data 
of the thirty 5-4 categorization experiments. Validation of self-supervised learning during recall 
would require a bigger data set with a richer category structure. In the absence of such data, 
assuming a nonspecific Gaussian-distributed noise source is the simplest account that can explain 
the 5-4 data as a result of a biologically-based incremental category learning process. 
Simulation results of the dARTMAP model suggest that, for the 5-4 category structure, 
subject learning naturally produces a type of rule-plus-exceptions categorization. On average, the 
model created two prototypes per category, one of them a “rule” that covers a large region of the 
feature space, and the other an “exception” that covers a small region of the feature space. 
Individual model “subjects” may produce a wide variety of memory representations, each 
producing similarly accurate performance. These results clarify how a small population of cells 
in inferotemporal cortex can categorize objects in the world (Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993). 
The exemplar model of Nosofsky and colleagues has been used to simulate the 
experimental data of Knowlton and Squire (1993) from amnesia patients. Amnesic subjects and 
normal subjects perform equally well on easy categorization tasks, but the performance of 
amnesic subjects drops significantly for more demanding tasks. Knowlton and Squire posited 
that two separate memory systems are needed to explain their data. In contrast, Zaki, Nosofsky, 
Jessup, and Unversagt (2003) fit these data with a single exemplar-based model with the model 
sensitivity parameter chosen lower for amnesic than for normal subjects. As noted in Section 1, 
formal exemplar models, when interpreted as dynamic process models, implicitly posit prototype 
and top-down processes akin to ART. Carpenter and Grossberg (1993) used an ART model to 
qualitatively explain amnesic data properties by using a low vigilance parameter. A low 
sensitivity parameter c in the Nosofsky exemplar model (see equation (4)) plays a role similar to 
that played by a low vigilance parameter ρ in an ART model (see Appendix equations A16, A17, 
and A23). Thus the current article’s explanation of categorization data from normal human 
subjects, which previously have been best explained by exemplar models, might also generalize 
to explaining categorization data from amnesic subjects. 
What does varying the sensitivity parameter do? As noted in Section 3.1, equation (11) 
has the same form as the second expression in equation (9). What is this form? By (4), 
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for Y = A or B. The equality holds because |Xij – Yj| equals 0 or 1, so ( )2Xi Y Xi Yj j j j− = − . 
The right side of equation (12) is the Mahalanobis distance with mean Y and diagonal 
covariance matrix Σ: 
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(Mahalanobis, 1930). Note that the similarity measure iYS  defined in equation (8) is the 
exponential of the expression in equation (18). The Multiplicative Prototype Model thus 
implicitly assumes that the conditional density P(i|A) can be approximated by a multi-
dimensional Gaussian distribution with mean Y=A or B and covariance Σ. 
Increasing the sensitivity parameter c increases the numerical separation between 
members of Category A and members of Category B. In the sigmoid form of P(A|i) in 
equation (9), increasing separation is expressed as a steeper transition region. In the Bayesian 
framework, it causes a more peaked form of P(A|i) centered around the prototype. Smith and 
Minda (2000) proposed that the parameter c should be bigger for old exemplars than for new 
exemplars. This hypothesis implies a more step-like, steeper sigmoid for old exemplars and a 
more line-like, slower transition for new exemplars. As a result, old items are categorized more 
consistently with few errors, which implies that they are located at the two extremes of the P(A|i) 
axis. New items are categorized less consistently and are closer to the middle of the P(A|i) axis. 
From the Bayesian perspective, a larger value of c implies smaller values in the diagonal of the 
covariance matrix Σ, which implies smaller variations for the corresponding variables in the prior 
P(A|i). Since subjects would make fewer errors with items on which they were trained, P(A|i) 
would peak in the region where items belonging to Category A lie and then decay rapidly to zero 
in order to exclude regions occupied by items from Category B. This implies a Gaussian with a 
small spread, which in turn requires a large value for c. A small value of c, or ρ, in amnesic 
subjects would undermine such an advantage for old exemplars. 
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APPENDIX:  Distributed ARTMAP Algorithm 
 
In the general case, distributed ARTMAP (dARTMAP) learns to predict an arbitrary output 
vector ( )1,..., ,...,k Lb b b=b  in response to an input vector ( )1,..., ,...,i Ma a a=a . The special case 
of a categorization problem sets one output component 1Kb =  and all 0jb = , j K≠ , to learn 
that input a belongs in the output category K. A complete dARTMAP system may be 
implemented as a real–time network with local computations (Figure 2). The current algorithm 
uses only variables that are needed for category learning and performance (Table A1). Table A2 
lists system parameters, along with their domains and values used in simulations. See also 
Section 4 for a heuristic description of important dARTMAP computations.  
Table A1 
Table A2 
 
A.1. Network activation 
dARTMAP network activation begins with the presentation of an M-dimensional input vector a, 
with input feature values ai such that 0 1ia≤ ≤ , to the dARTa  field F0 and, during training only, 
an L-dimensional output training vector b to field 0
bF  (Figure 2). In the 5-4 category structure, 
M = 4 and L = 2.  
Field F0 contains 2M nodes, indexed by i, whose activation complement codes the input 
pattern: 
{ if  11 if  M+1 2ii i Ma i MA a i M− ≤ ≤= − ≤ ≤ .  (A1) 
Complement coding captures both the presence of a feature as an ON cell response 
( )1, 1i ia A= =  and the absence of a feature as an OFF cell response ( )0, 1i i Ma A += =  as possible 
critical pattern components. (See also Section 4.1.) 
Each category coding node j in field F2 stores a learned categorization pattern in its 
bottom-up long-term memory (LTM) traces τij. Activation of category coding nodes by F0 is 
determined jointly by a tonic component (independent of F0 activation A) and a phasic 
component (dependent on the match of node j to A). F2 nodes that best match A receive the 
greatest input. In geometric terms (see Section 6.2), the input from F0 to node j is 
( , )j j jT M d R Rα= − −a , (A2) 
where ( , )jd R a  is the city-block (L1 norm) distance between category coding box j and input a, 
jR  is the size of coding box j, and the signal rule parameter α is a fixed positive value. This 
choice-by-difference form of Tj favors nodes with small coding boxes ( )0jR ≅  that are close to 
the input a ( )( , ) 0jd R ≅a . For small values of the signal rule parameter ( )0α ≅ , Tj is largest 
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when a is inside Rj, ( )( , ) 0jd R =a . When a is inside multiple category boxes, Tj favors the 
smallest box containing a.  
The category box size jR  has the following definition in terms of network dynamics: 
j jR M= − w , (A3) 
where 
2
1
M
j ij
i
w
=
= ∑w , the category coding weight 1ij ijw τ= − , and ijτ  is the bottom-up LTM trace 
from F0 node i to F2 node j (see equations A19 and A25).  Similarly, the distance ( , )jd R a equals: 
( ) ( )
( , )
,
j j j
j j
j j
d R R R
M M
= ⊕ −
= − ∧ − −
= − ∧
a a
A w w
w A w
 (A4) 
where jR ⊕ a  is the size of Rj when expanded to include a, and the fuzzy minimum vector 
components { }( ) min ,j i i ijA w∧ =A w . Intuitively, j jR R⊕ −a  measures the amount Rj must 
expand to include a, and j j− ∧w A w  is the amount all learned weights wij must decrease in 
total in order for new newj j= ∧w A w . Input function Tj can then be separated into phasic and tonic 
components: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( , )
1
1 ,
j j j
j j j
j j
j j
T M d R R
M M
M
S
α
α
α
α
= − −
= − − ∧ − −
= ∧ + − −
= + − Θ
a
w A w w
A w w
 (A5) 
where the phasic component  
( )2
1
(1 )
M
j j i ij
i
S A τ
=
= ∧ = ∧ −∑A w ,  (A6) 
and the tonic component 
2 2
1 1
(1 )
M M
j j ij ij
i i
M M Mτ τ
= =
Θ = − = − − = −∑ ∑w . (A7) 
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The final set of F2 input equations is then: 
( )
( )
2
1
2
1
Phasic:  (1 )
Tonic:
Total: 1 .
M
j i ij
i
M
j ij
i
j j j
S A
M
T S
τ
τ
α
=
=
= ∧ −
Θ = −
= + − Θ
∑
∑   (A8) 
In order for a category coding node to remain active, it must receive at least as much 
input as an uncommitted node. An uncommitted node has all bottom-up LTM thresholds 0ijτ ≡  
and thus, by (A8), its input  Tu = αM. Suppressing the activation of committed nodes with input 
u
jT T<  prevents learning by their LTM traces when the training pattern would be better 
represented by recruiting a new category coding node. The set of active category coding nodes Λ 
is, thus, initially 
{ }1,..., : ujj C T T≡ = ≥Λ ,  (A9) 
where C is the number of committed category coding nodes. 
F2 activation is normally distributed: all category coding nodes j ∈Λ  are activated as a 
function of their input Tj. In a real-time network implementation, F2 nodes compete with each 
other in a pattern of on-center excitation and off-surround inhibition. A steady-state 
implementation approximates this competition using the increased-gradient content addressable 
memory (IG-CAM) rule: 
Λ
1   if Λ
0            if Λ
p
j
j
j
M T
y
M T
j
λ λ∈
⎧ ∈⎪ ⎡ ⎤−⎪= ⎢ ⎥⎨ −⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ∉⎩
∑  , (A10) 
where the CAM rule power p is a free parameter that determines the amount of contrast 
enhancement. In particular, by equation (A2), ( , )j jM T d R− ≅ a  for small values of the signal 
rule parameter α. Thus, as the distance between input a and a single category coding box RJ  
decreases toward zero, activation yJ increases toward one, all other yj decrease toward zero, and 
F2 approaches a winner-take-all (WTA) activation pattern. If a is inside multiple boxes, 
activation is shared amongst those nodes, biased toward the node with the smallest box, and all 
other node activations are significantly reduced. If a is outside all category coding boxes, the 
activation pattern remains at a low contrast. Increasing p increases the degree to which F2 
activation contrast is enhanced in favor of the node with the most input Tj. If one or more nodes 
exactly match A (i.e., their category coding boxes are point boxes at a), then Tj = M, and (A10) is 
computationally undefined. Let  
{ }Λ Λ jj T M′′ = ∈ =:  (A11) 
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be the set of nodes with point-boxes at a. If Λ′′  is not empty, then yj is defined to distribute 
activation evenly among those nodes in Λ′′ , intuitively by a mechanism of self-normalizing 
competition: 
1   if 
0    if 
j
j
y
j
⎧ ′′∈⎪ ′′= ⎨⎪ ′′∉⎩
Λ
Λ
Λ
.  (A12) 
Field F3 contains C nodes, each node corresponding to a category coding node in F2 (see 
Figure 2). F3 activation biases the distributed input from F2 (yj) with instance counting weights 
cj: 
1
j j
j C
c y
Y
c yλ λ
λ =
=
∑
.  (A13) 
Counting weights reflect the previous category coding node activations summed over training set 
inputs. Thus, a node j with greater and more frequent training activations contributes more to F3 
activation Yj. The denominator of (A13) ensures that the total F3 activation is normalized: 
1
1
C
j
j
Y
=
=∑ , again reflecting a process of self-normalizing competition. 
This instance-biased activation drives the 3 1F F→  top-down expectation signal σi, 
filtered by adaptive thresholds τji: 
1
C
i j ji
j
Yσ τ +
=
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∑ ,  (A14) 
1,...., 2i M= , where the threshold rectification [ ] { }max , 0w w+ ≡ . In (A14), σi represents the 
critical feature pattern for the distributed F2 category code. Including Yj, which is always less 
than or equal to one, modulates each node’s contribution to σi according to its F3 activation: 
nodes with strong Yj contribute more, and nodes with weak Yj contribute less, or not at all when 
Yj ≤ τji. Geometrically, the σi represent category coding boxes Rj(Yj) that expand as Yj increases. 
(For more detail on the geometry of distributed coding, see Carpenter, 1997, and Carpenter et al., 
1998.) 
Activation xi of each F1 node i (see Figure 2) reflects the match between the top-down 
expectation signal σi and the bottom-up input Ai: 
i i ix A σ= ∧ ,  (A15) 
1,..., 2i M= . In order for system activation to persist and for learning to occur, F1 activation 
must pass the vigilance test: its total activation must be greater than the threshold ρM; namely,  
2
1
M
i
i
x Mρ
=
≥∑ ,  (A16) 
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where vigilance ρ varies between an initial baseline value ρ  and 1. A large value of ρ requires a 
very good match: all σi must be very similar to Ai. The baseline vigilance value of 0ρ =  allows 
category coding boxes Rj(Yj) to expand as much as necessary, as long as the system predicts the 
correct category (see Section 4.2.).  
If a mismatch occurs; namely, 
2
1
M
i
i
x Mρ
=
<∑ , (A17) 
F1 activation fails the vigilance test. Then the distributed top-down expectation was not a good 
enough match to the input pattern, so the system will begin to search for a category coding node 
with a better match. Search resets the activity at the category coding field F2 and forces a new 
winner-take-all (WTA) activation, wherein 
{ }1 arg max
0 otherwise
jjj
j J T
y ∈
⎧ = =⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
Λ .  (A18) 
In (A18), the winning node index J represents the category coding node with the greatest input. 
Activation at the instance counting and match fields, F3 and F1, respectively, updates according 
to (A13-15) to reflect the new WTA activation at the category coding field F2. If the new F1 
activation still does not pass vigilance, F2 activation is reset again. Node J enters a refractory 
state, wherein it can no longer be reactivated for the duration of input a’s presentation, and so it 
is removed from the active search node set Λ in (A9). Search via WTA activation at F2 and 
subsequent reset continues with a new winning node J that has the next largest input Tj in (A18) 
until a node that passes the vigilance test (A16) is found. If no committed node is found that can 
pass vigilance, a new category coding node is recruited, activated, and associated to the target 
output category label K. Recruitment triggers fast learning at the newly selected category; 
namely, a fast commitment of LTM thresholds, such that the new category coding box RJ is a 
point box at a: 
1iJ Ji iAτ τ= = − ,  (A19) 
1,..., 2i M= .  
In all, when the match at F1 passes the vigilance test, the 3F  activity pattern Yj forms the 
category prediction signal σk from 3F  to 0
abF  (see Figure 2). Each 3F  node j is associated with a 
single output category k according to the mapping κ(j) = k, supported by 3 0abF F→  connection 
weights tuned when node j was first recruited. The prediction field 0
abF  has L nodes, one for each 
output category, and each node’s input σk sums the associated 3F  node activations: 
( )1
C
k j
j
j k
Y
κ
σ
=
=
= ∑ .  (A20) 
This distributed prediction signal undergoes winner-take-all competition at 0
abF . Node index K' 
is the smallest index k with the maximum input: 
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{ }arg max kK σ′ = , (A21) 
and winning 0
abF  activation: 
{10 otherwisek k KZ ′== . (A22) 
During training, 0
abF  node activations Zk are matched at 1
abF  with the target training outputs bk at 
0
bF  (see Figure 2). If the two patterns do not match, the system made an incorrect category 
prediction ( )K K′ ≠  and must be corrected. Match tracking (MT) helps correct the error by 
increasing vigilance just enough to reset activation (see (A17)) at the category coding field F2: 
2
1
1 M
i
i
x
M
ρ ε
=
= +∑ , (A23) 
where the match-tracking parameter ε is a small, fixed value. As noted in Section 4.2, match 
tracking implements a minimax learning property that conjointly maximizes generalization while 
minimizing predictive error. The MT− match tracking search rule, defined as (A23) with a 
negative value for the match tracking parameter ε, permits the next winning category coding 
node to match A just as well as the currently active code; MT− supports the encoding of 
inconsistent cases. In contrast, the MT+ match tracking search rule, defined as (A23) with a 
positive value for ε, requires the next winning node to be a better match then the currently active 
code. Match tracking resets F2 activation and switches it to winner-take-all mode, and a search 
for a better matching code continues.  
If the top-down expectation and bottom-up input patterns do match (that is, (A16) is 
satisfied), signifying that the network made a correct prediction, then F2 category coding nodes 
learn via a process of adaptive resonance, described as follows. 
0 2
bF F→  credit assignment connections deactivate all category coding nodes except 
those mapped to the target category K, and F2 activities are renormalized such that the total 
activation 
1
1
C
j
j
y
=
=∑ :  
( )
( )
( )
1
if    (correct category)   
0 if    (incorrect category)
old
j
C
old
j
K
y
j K
yy
j K
λ
λ
κ λ
κ
κ
=
=
⎧ =⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪ ≠⎩
∑ , (A24) 
where oldjy  is the activation of node j prior to credit assignment. F3 and F1 activations update to 
reflect the new yj according to (A13-A15). Credit assignment, facilitated by 0 2
bF F→  connection 
weights learned during F2 node recruitment, ensures that only nodes mapped to K will learn.  
Category learning occurs using a distributed instar learning law in 0 2F F→  bottom-up 
pathways. Learning increases the thresholds ijτ : 
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old old
ij ij j ij iy Aτ τ β τ +⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦ ,  (A25) 
where oldijτ is the value of ijτ  prior to learning, and the learning rate β is a positive parameter. The 
second term in (A25) represents the amount of learning required for the dynamic bottom-up 
weight ij j ijw y τ +⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  to decrease toward Ai as the threshold ijτ  increases. Thus, fast learning 
(β = 1) quickly expands the dynamic category coding box Rj(yj) to include a.  
Learning of top-down expectations occurs using a distributed outstar learning law in 
3 1F F→  top-down pathways. Learning increases the thresholds jiτ : 
[ ]i iold old
ji ji j ji
i
A
Y
στ τ β τσ
+
+− ⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦ .  (A26) 
During fast learning, dynamic top-down weights ji j jiw Y τ +⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  decrease until i iAσ ≤ , at 
which time the category boxes Rj(Yj) enclose a. The first multiplicative term, 
[ ]i i
i
Aσ
σ
+−
 , 
represents the proportion by which iσ  must decrease to be less than or equal to Ai. The second 
multiplicative term, j jiY τ +⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ ,  represents the total amount of learning possible on jiτ  while 
also restricting the dynamic weight jiw  to be a non-negative value. The second additive term of 
(A26) in total, [ ]i i oldj ji
i
A
Y
σβ τσ
+
+− ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ , represents jiτ ’s share of learning toward the goal of 
decreasing iσ  toward Ai. 
Lastly, instance counting weights from F2 to F3 are updated as follows: 
old
j j jc c y= + , (A27) 
where oldjc  is the value of jc prior to learning. 
During testing, no target category K exists. The active 0
abF node index K' represents the 
predicted category, and LTM traces adapt according to one of four models. In Model 0, no 
adaptation occurs. In Model 1, LTM traces adapt according to equations (A25) and (A26) above, 
without any credit assignment (A24). Model 2 adapts LTM traces exactly as in training, treating 
the category prediction K' as if it were a target output category K. Models 3 and 4 adapt LTM 
traces by adding random, normally distributed noise  
( )20,Nξ ν∼  (A28) 
to every active category coding node’s thresholds: 
0 2F F→  bottom-up threshold: oldij ijτ τ ξ= +  (A29) 
3 1F F→  top-down threshold: oldji jiτ τ ξ= +  (A30) 
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Both ijτ  and jiτ  are constrained to the unit interval; that is, ( ){ }min max 0, ,1oldij ijτ τ ξ= + . Model 
3 updates thresholds for all active nodes without any prior credit assignment. Model 4 first 
imposes credit assignment (A24), and as such, only thresholds for nodes mapped to the predicted 
category K' are updated. 
The following iterative steps condense the above description into an implementable 
algorithm. For clarity and conciseness, network activation steps are omitted when they do not 
impact category learning or prediction.  
 
A.2. dARTMAP Training 
For each training input and target category label ( a, K ): 
1. Initialize the network: 
1.1. Set the vigilance variable to its baseline value: ρ ρ= . 
1.2. Set the category coding node count C = 0. 
1.3. Set the coding field F2 activation mode to distributed. 
2. Activate the input field F0 (Ai) via the complement-coding equation (A1). 
3. Calculate F2 inputs Tj via the choice-by-difference equation (A8). 
4. Define the active F2 node sets Λ  and Λ′′  via equations (A9) and (A11). 
5. If the active F2 node set Λ  is empty, recruit a new category coding node. 
5.1. Set the winning node index J = C + 1.  
5.2. Set its LTM thresholds via the fast-commit equation (A19). 
5.3. Map the new node to the target category: κ(J) = K. 
5.4. Increment the category coding node count C by 1. 
5.5. Continue to the next training input (Step 1). 
6. If F2 is in distributed mode: 
6.1. If the point-box node set Λ′′ is empty, calculate F2 activation yj via the IG-CAM rule 
(A10). 
6.2. Otherwise (Λ′′ is not empty), calculate F2 activation yj via the alternate IG-CAM rule 
(A12). 
7. Otherwise (F2 is in WTA mode), determine the winning node J, and calculate F2 activation yj 
via the WTA equation (A18). 
8. Activate the counting field F3 (Yj) via equation (A13). 
9. Activate the matching field F1: 
9.1. Calculate the top-down expectation signal σi via equation (A14). 
9.2. Calculate the F1 activation xi via equation (A15). 
10. If F1 fails vigilance via equation (A17): 
10.1. Set the F2 activation mode to WTA. 
10.2. Return to Step 5. 
11. Otherwise (F1 passes vigilance via equation (A16)), continue to Step 12 for category 
prediction. 
12. Calculate the category prediction signal σk via equation (A20). 
13. Calculate the category prediction K' via equation (A21). 
14. If K' does not equal the target category K: 
14.1. Raise vigilance ρ via the match-tracking equation (A23). 
14.2. If F2 is in WTA mode, remove the winning node J from active node set Λ. 
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14.3. Otherwise (F2 is in distributed mode), set the F2 activation mode to WTA. 
14.4. Return to Step 5. 
15. Otherwise (K' = K), continue to Step 16 for credit assignment and learning. 
16. Reactivate fields F2, F3, and F1 according to the credit-assignment equation (A24) and 
(A13-A15). 
17. Learn: 
17.1. Update the bottom-up thresholds ijτ  via the distributed instar equation (A25). 
17.2. Update the top-down thresholds jiτ via the distributed outstar equation (A26). 
17.3. Update instance-counting weights cj via equation (A27). 
 
A.3. dARTMAP Testing 
For each testing input a: 
1. Activate the input field F0 (Ai) via the complement-coding equation (A1). 
2. Calculate F2 inputs Tj via the choice-by-difference equation (A8). 
3. Define the active F2 node sets Λ  and Λ′′ via equations (A9) and (A11). 
4. If the point-box node set Λ′′ is empty, calculate F2 activation yj via the IG-CAM rule (A10). 
5. Otherwise (Λ′′ is not empty), calculate F2 activation yj via the alternate IG-CAM rule (A12). 
6. Activate the counting field F3 (Yj) via equation (A13). 
7. Calculate the category prediction signal σk via equation (A20). 
8. Calculate the category prediction K' via equation (A21). 
9. For LTM update models 2 and 4, reactivate fields F2, F3, and F1 according to the credit-
assignment equation (A24) and (A13-A15). 
10. For LTM update models 1 and 2, update bottom-up thresholds ijτ  via the distributed instar 
equation (A24) and top-down thresholds jiτ  via the distributed outstar equation (A26). 
11. For LTM update models 3 and 4, update the bottom-up and top-down thresholds by noise-
addition equations (A28-A30). 
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Exemplar 
component values ( ai ) 
Projection for 
Figures 7, 8 
 
Categories and 
exemplars a1  a2  a3  a4  x y 
Category A       
A1 1 1 1 0 1 2/3 
A2 1 0 1 0 2/3 2/3 
A3 1 0 1 1 2/3 1 
A4 1 1 0 1 1 1/3 
A5 0 1 1 1 1/3 1 
Category B       
B6 1 1 0 0 1 0 
B7 0 1 1 0 1/3 2/3 
B8 0 0 0 1 0 1/3 
B9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transfer       
T10 1 0 0 1 2/3 1/3 
T11 1 0 0 0 2/3 0 
T12 1 1 1 1 1 1 
T13 0 0 1 0 0 2/3 
T14 0 1 0 1 1/3 1/3 
T15 0 0 1 1 0 1 
T16 0 1 0 0 1/3 0 
 
Table 1:  Exemplars and category labels for the 5-4 category structure. Prototype models assume 
that exemplar T12 = 1,1,1,1[ ] is the prototype of Category A and that exemplar B9 = 0,0,0,0[ ] is 
the prototype of Category B. The two right-hand columns are coordinates of exemplars projected 
onto a 2D visualization plane (Figures 7 and 8). 
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Table A1:  dARTMAP notation. 
 
NOTATION DESCRIPTION RANGE EQUATIONS 
M Number of input features  A1-A8, A10, A11, 
A14-A17, A19, A23 
L Number of output categories   
K Correct output category for training input { }1,...,K L∈  A24 
i Input component index and  
node index for fields F0 and F1 
i = 1,…,M 
i = 1,…,2M 
A1, A6-A8, A14-A17, A19, 
A23, A25, A26, A29, A30 
a Input feature vector (ai), i = 1,…,M 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1 A1, A2, A4, A5 
A F0 field activity (Ai), i = 1,…,2M 0 ≤ Ai ≤ 1 A1, A4-A6, A8, A15, A19, 
A25, A26 
j Category coding node index for fields F2 
and F3 
j = 1,…,C A2-A14, A18, A20, 
A24-A27, A29, A30 
C Number of committed category coding nodes  A9, A13, A14, A20, A24 
τij 0 2F F→  bottom-up long-term memory 
threshold from input node i to category 
coding node j 
[ ]0,1ijτ ∈  A6-A8, A19, A25, A29 
Sj Phasic input to category coding node j [ ]0,jS M∈  A5, A6, A8 
jΘ  Tonic input to category coding node j [ ]0,j MΘ ∈  A5, A7, A8 
Tj 0 2F F→  input signal to category coding 
node j 
[ ]0,jT M∈  A2, A5, A8-A11, A18 
Λ, Λ′′ In distributed mode, the index sets of active 
category coding nodes 
{ }1,...,C⊆  A9, A10-A12, A18 
J In winner-take-all mode, the index of the 
chosen category coding node 
{ }1,...,J C∈  A18, A19 
y 2F  category coding field activation (yj) [ ]0,1jy ∈  A10, A12, A13, A18, A24, 
A25, A27 
cj Instance-counting weight to counting node j 1jc ≥  A13, A27 
Y 3F  counting field activation (Yj) [ ]0,1jY ∈  A13, A14, A20, A26 
τji 3 1F F→  top-down long-term memory 
threshold from category coding node j to 
matching node i 
[ ]0,1jiτ ∈  A14, A19, A26, A30 
σi 2 1F F→  top-down expectation, i = 1,…,2M [ ]0,1iσ ∈  A14, A15, A26 
x 
1F  match field activation (xi), i = 1,…,2M [ ]0,1ix ∈  A15-A17, A23 
ρ Vigilance variable [ ],1ρ ρ∈  A16, A17, A23 
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NOTATION DESCRIPTION RANGE EQUATIONS 
k Output category index for 0
abF , 1
abF , and 0
bF  k = 1,…,L A20-A22 
( )j kκ =  Association between the category coding 
node j and the output category k 
( ) { }1,...,j Lκ ∈  A20, A24 
σk 3 0
abF F→  prediction signal [ ]0,1kσ ∈  A20, A21 
K' Predicted output category { }1,...,K L′ ∈  A21, A22 
Z 
0
abF  category field activation (Zk) { }0,1kZ ∈  A22 
ξ  Noise added to long-term memory  A28-A30 
 
Table A1:  dARTMAP notation (Continued). 
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PARAMETER RANGE SIMULATION 
VALUE 
EQUATIONS 
0 2F F→  signal rule parameter α (0,1)  0.01 A2, A5 
0 2F F→  signal to uncommitted nodes Tu 0ijjT τ ≡  αM A9 
2F  CAM rule power p (0,∞]  1.0 A10 
Baseline vigilance ρ  [0,1]  0.0  
Match tracking parameter ε ε  small -0.001 (MT-) A23 
Learning rate β (0,1]  1.0 (fast learning) A25, A26 
Standard deviation of noise added  
to long-term memory ν  
0.0332 (Model 3)  
0.0626 (Model 4) A28, A29 
 
Table A2:  dARTMAP parameters. 
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(a) 
 
 
(b)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Silhouette indices S(i)  for the nine training exemplars of the 5-4 category structure 
experiments. See equation (2). A Silhouette index close to +1 indicates that the item is correctly 
assigned to the corresponding cluster. A small positive index value implies weak membership of 
this item in the cluster to which it is assigned. A negative Silhouette index value implies that the 
item is wrongly assigned. The city-block (L1 norm) distance measure of used throughout. The 
Euclidean (L2) norm produces similar results. 
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Figure 2:  dARTMAP model circuit. Activity patterns y at the field 2F  represent distributed 
category codes. Winner-take-all (WTA) activation at the field 0
abF  represents categorical output 
category predictions K ′  (A or B in the 5-4 category problem). During training, WTA activation 
at 0
bF  represents the actual output category (K) provided by the teacher. A mismatch at 1
abF  
causes a match tracking signal to raise the dARTa  vigilance ρ just enough to reset the active code 
at F2. The ∧  symbol in the matching field F1 denotes a minimum operation, that is, { }min ,i i i i ix A Aσ σ= ∧ = . See the text and Appendix for details. 
κ
CATEGORY 
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Error in model fit to experimental data
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Figure 3: Model fits to aggregate experimental data, with errors measured as the sum of squared 
deviations. Solid bars are model fits presented by Smith and Minda (2000). Textured bars are fits 
for the dARTMAP simulations of the post-training update Models 0-4. All dARTMAP network 
parameters are fixed a priori at principled values. Only the noise parameter (ν) of Models 3 and 
4 was tuned to fit the data. The best values of ν  were 0.0332 for Model 3 and 0.0626 for 
Model 4. The Smith and Minda (2000) fits did not arise from learning and required many more 
parameters. See text for details. 
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Figure 4: Simulation results of dARTMAP with post-training update Models 0-4. Model 
performance is expressed as the fraction of trials predicting Category A given exemplar i, P(A|i) 
(dotted lines), as compared to the mean of the thirty Smith and Minda (2000) experiments (solid 
lines). SSD is the sum of squared deviations from the experimental mean. 
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Figure 5:  Histogram of the number of dARTMAP category coding nodes for Category A and for 
Category B learned during training. The vertical axis represents the number of the approximately 
1,500 simulation trials, each presenting dARTMAP with inputs in a different, random order, 
producing a given number of nodes per category. On 86% of trials, dARTMAP created two 
coding nodes for each category, indicating that the representation is neither purely prototype-
based (only one node per category) nor purely exemplar based (one node for each training 
exemplar). Figure 7 helps illustrate why two nodes are required for each category. Distributed 
ARTMAP created as few category coding nodes as possible to adequately represent the training 
patterns. Most training exemplars are well represented by a prototype-like node for each category 
but, on nearly all trials, dARTMAP cannot make a correct category prediction for at least one 
training exemplar without creating an additional node to capture an “exception” to the general 
category “rule.” 
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Figure 6:  Histogram of the sizes of category coding boxes RJ for Category A and Category B 
learned by dARTMAP across approximately 1,500 random orderings of the training set. Solid, 
dark-gray bars labeled with a large, bold “A” indicate the sizes of the largest Category A box, 
whereas solid, light-gray bars labeled with a small “A” indicate sizes for the second largest 
Category A box. Similarly, wide-striped bars and a large, bold “B” are for the largest Category B 
box, and narrow-striped bars with a small “B” are for the second largest Category B box. Large 
boxes correspond to prototype memories, or rules. Small boxes correspond to exemplar 
memories, or exceptions. Note that the mode size is 3 for the largest box and 0 for the second 
largest box of both categories, fitting a rule-plus-exception description.  
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Figure 7:  Three dARTMAP networks that 
typify a rule-plus-exceptions representation, 
plotted as linear projections of exemplars and 
coding boxes onto a two-dimensional 
subspace. The axis labels show the 
contributions of each positive value in the 
original feature space (a1, a2, a3, a4) to the 
projection axes. For example, the two 
prototype exemplars [ ]B9 0,0,0,0=  and 
[ ]T12 1,1,1,1=  map to points [ ]0,0  and 
[ ]1,1 . Coding nodes for Category A are 
represented as solid-line boxes, and coding 
nodes for Category B are represented as 
dashed-line boxes. In the depicted cases, 
each category is represented by one large 
“rule” category coding box, enclosing most 
training exemplars, and one small 
“exception” category coding box, enclosing 
one or two training exemplars. Each case is 
the result of learning on the training 
exemplars in a different order. In the first 
plot, for example, the model initially creates 
point boxes at A5 and B9. The point box at 
B9 then extends to include the points B8 and 
B6 and becomes the large “rule” box at the 
bottom half of the plot (dashed lines). 
Likewise, the box at A5 extends to include 
A1, A2, and A3, and becomes the large 
“rule” box at the top half of the plot (solid 
lines). However, when A4 is presented, the 
model initially predicts B because A4 is 
inside the Category B box. Match tracking 
raises vigilance such that learning can only 
occur on a category coding node that 
matches A4 better than the Category B box. 
Thus, the existing Category A box cannot 
expand downward, and a new point box is 
created at A4. A similar process creates the 
point box at B7.  
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Figure 8:  Simulation trials where the 
dARTMAP learned representations deviate 
from the rule-plus-exceptions description. 
Rather than capturing each category with a 
single “rule” box and one or more small 
“exception” boxes, multiple medium-sized 
boxes here represent the training data. This 
deviation occurs for at least one category on 
35% of simulation trials and results from 
particular training orders and from match 
tracking preventing large “rule” boxes from 
forming. For example, in the first plot, the 
model initially creates point boxes to 
represent B6 and A5. When A4 is presented, 
the model first predicts B because A4 is 
closest to the point box at B6. Match tracking 
prevents the existing Category A box from 
expanding, and so a new point box is created 
at A4. This new box then expands to include 
A1. When A2 is presented, learning is 
distributed between the box at A5 and the 
box at A4, partially expanding both of them 
toward A2.  
Atypical dARTMAP trials 
 
0 a2 a1 a1 & a2
0
a4
a3
a3 & a4
A1A2
A3
A4
A5
B6
B7
B8
B9
T10
T11
T12
T13
T14
T15
T16
0 a2 a1 a1 & a2
0
a4
a3
a3 & a4
A1A2
A3
A4
A5
B6
B7
B8
B9
T10
T11
T12
T13
T14
T15
T16
0 a2 a1 a1 & a2
0
a4
a3
a3 & a4
A1A2
A3
A4
A5
B6
B7
B8
B9
T10
T11
T12
T13
T14
T15
T16
— Category A - - - Category B 
45 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Training Exemplar
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 E
rro
r
 
 Experiment Model Point box
 
 
Figure 9: Probability of testing errors for the training exemplars A1,…,A5 and B6,…,B9. The 
solid-lined, square-marked curve represents the mean probability of error across the Smith and 
Minda (2000) experiments. The dotted-lined, circle-marked curve represents the fraction of 
dARTMAP models making an error for each training exemplar i. The dashed-lined, plus-marked 
curve represents the fraction of dARTMAP trials in which training exemplar i is represented by a 
point box. The point box curve is scaled by 0.87 to better illustrate its correlation with the 
probability of experimental error. 
 
